



YES GROUP SEMINAR

14TH JANUARY 2016 - EUROSONIC (GRONINGEN)

**NEW SECURITY STANDARDS IN
TROUBLED TIMES**

AFTER – PARIS 13.11.2015



AFTER – PARIS 13.11.2015



Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice

for Major Events



produced by

NaCTSO
National Counter Terrorism Security Office



FICHE
RISQUE ATTENTAT

Renforcement des mesures de sûreté dans les salles de spectacle

Cette fiche présente les consignes à mettre en œuvre et les recommandations concernant la sûreté des salles de spectacle. Elles n'écartent pas la responsabilité du chef d'établissement.

I - LES CONSIGNES À METTRE EN ŒUVRE

❶ Rendre visible les mesures de protection et informer

- affichage du logo « VIGIPIRATE » aux endroits où des mesures de protection renforcées sont mises en place ;
- information claire (en utilisant les pictogrammes internationaux) concernant les mesures de sûreté, sur le site web de la salle et à ses points d'entrée : informer le public de ne pas se présenter avec des bagages ou sacs volumineux ; mentionner les contrôles aux accès dans les Conditions Générales de Vente (CGV) des droits d'entrées, et dans la mesure du possible sur les billets eux-mêmes ;



LE HAUT
FONCTIONNAIRE
DE DÉFENSE ET
DE SÉCURITÉ

billboard

How Much Will Concert Security Change After Paris? Industry Insiders Weigh In

11/18/2015 by Dan Rys , Ray Waddell and Chris Willman



AFTER – PARIS 13.11.2015

- ▶ Very violent and unprecedented event = collective trauma
- ▶ Total change in risk perception
- ▶ Passing from a rational approach that under-estimate the risk to an emotional approach that over-estimated it
- ▶ Very hypothetical risk with immeasurable magnitude if it occurs
- ▶ How to build a risk management strategy in this context, without alibi or disproportionate measures?

HOW TO EVALUATE THE RISK ?

- ▶ Risk is defined as the existence of a likelihood of a hazard to materialize in one or more scenarios , combined with adverse consequences on property or people.
- ▶ The risk level is then quantified by the linear combination between the probability of occurrence of each scenario and the amplitude of the consequences associated to this scenario.

PROBABILITY

| | | |
|--|--|---------------------|
| | | X (after Paris) |
| | | X (after Paris) |
| | | X (before Paris) |

MAGNITUDE

?

FIRST REACTIONS / IMMEDIATE IDEAS

- ▶ More video surveillance ?
- ▶ Body search at the entrance ?
- ▶ Metal detectors at the entrance ?
- ▶ Pre-controls at the exit of parkings (for pedestrians) ?
- ▶ Checkpoints with armed officers?
- ▶ Armed security agents on site?
- ▶ ...

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

What will we be dealing with ?

- ▶ Isolated or massive shooting attack ?
- ▶ Suicide explosive vest ?
- ▶ Bomb threat ?
- ▶ Knife attack ?
- ▶ Hostage taking situation ?
- ▶ ...
- ▶ New paradigm : not only one of those but simultaneous or successive attacks (cf. Paris, November 2015)

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

What is the level of the threat?

- ▶ Difficult assessment
- ▶ Limits of Police Intelligence (individual radicalization)
- ▶ Disconnection between the statistical probability and potential of risk
- ▶ Additional difficulty : no way to use the conventional risk analysis tools

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

Which preventive measures will be necessary to decide ?

- ▶ According to changes in the level of risk, graduated measures should be anticipated and ready to be implemented
- ▶ Provide a evolutive strategy (eg, levels 1-2-3) with a catalog of corresponding measures (search, perimeter surveillance, checkpoint with vehicle control , uniformed patrols , undercover observers , intervention group in reserve , etc.)

Important point : shared strategy with Police and Local authorities

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

- ▶ What do we have to anticipate ?
- ▶ Very fast change of the threat level (eg Brussels, Munich, Geneva recently)
- ▶ Evolution of police doctrine in the treatment of such cases (the primary involved principle)
- ▶ Effect of surprise and real crisis situation in which the proceedings will be provided inadequate (eg evacuation with VS dissemination strategy gathering points)

CONCLUSION

- ▶ No one knows what will be the situation in summer 2016.
- ▶ Since then, let's set up a think tank between us to actively monitor the risk and identify the best strategy.



Julian Dorio, Bataclan, 13.11.2015